In the course of history, there have been many problems that could not be solved given the tools available at the time. Such insoluble problems are generally related to a civilizational impasse of some kind. Relations between Russia and the West—and to an even greater degree between Russia and the United States—exemplify one of these kinds of problems. U.S-Russian relations show that neither side has been able to successfully manage the relics of the bipolar system that collapsed along with the Soviet Union. The problem is further complicated by the fact that Russia has not been able to deal with its own post-Soviet problems.
This has been demonstrated by the U.S.-Russian divergence on the Syrian crisis, which evolved into a real spat. The fact that Moscow and Washington have started to look for a common exit solution in Syria through working on the plan to place the Assad’s chemical toxins under international control does not liquidate neither reasons that brought Syrian drama nor the triggers that provoked the recent chill in U.S.- Russian relations. One should not be deceived by the face-saving attempts that both sides have gotten engaged in, for different reasons and with different expectations. Developments concerning the US-Russian relationship over the past few months only confirm how different the Kremlin and White House views of the world are, and how different their approaches to dealing with the challenges the world is facing today. Actually, Vladimir Putin’s recent op-ed in the New York Times, “A Plea for Caution from Russia“, is a proof of theses differences on the ideological, civilizational level
The Syrian rift has only made the problems in U.S.-Russian relations more apparent, leaving no room for illusions about the model on which the relationship is based. Just as in Soviet times, both mutual nuclear containment (based on the paradigm of mutually assured destruction) and pragmatic cooperation remain on the agenda for U.S-Russian relations. This model rejects the notion of relations based on mutual trust. Whenever one side or another needs to take care of tactical issues, it resorts to cooperation rhetoric and imitation partnership. The United States loses this game more often than not. Imitation is Russia’s strong suit, and the Kremlin is better at it than any of the Western democracies, but the United States also loses because its involvement in the imitation project undermines its moral stand; the Kremlin stopped caring about morals long ago.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between every American President and his Russian partner have invariably oscillated between crisis periods and cooling-off periods. Given that this pattern holds no matter who is in power on either side, one might posit that the periods of failure are more than just a function of the leaders’ personal preferences; one could argue that the differences in the principles that guide both sides are responsible for the rollercoaster nature of U.S.-Russian relations. But this outcome is not inevitable. The United States and China, for example, also adhere to different normative principles; nevertheless, their relations could be considered an example of cooperation.
I would argue that three structural factors play even a greater role in U.S.-Russian relations than their normative differences, thus precluding a relationship like the one United States has with China. First, the Russian Matrix—that is, personalized power—can’t survive without being propped up by Russian spheres of influence in the post-Soviet space. Second, the Russian elite has adopted scapegoating as a means of consolidating society—a method the Kremlin has always used in times of trouble (a little reminder: the United States is the Kremlin’s first choice as the enemy that must be contained wherever possible). Third, Russian-American relations lack the economic component present in Sino-American relations that would mitigate the containment factors.
If all these things are true, how is it that there were ever periods of fruitful cooperation, and even partnership, between Russia and the United States? The answer to this question lies in the situational circumstances that mitigated the containment trend. However, the power of such circumstances is quickly exhausted as both sides, or even one side, feels less of a need to strike tactical deals.
For instance, in the early stages of the George W. Bush presidency, Putin used America’s Global War on Terror to support his claim that the Chechen war was part of the same struggle. It was a tactical choice that neutralized Moscow’s gravitation toward containment—but only for a time. During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Kremlin suspected that the United States had infected that country with an “orange virus”; thus, the containment factors kicked in once again, since this time the survival of the Russian elite was at stake.
What factors, then, account for Moscow’s readiness to participate in President Obama’s restart policy? One could mention several tactical interests—in particular an appreciation of the threat posed by the Taliban, as well as Moscow’s hopes of obtaining new American investments and technologies. These interests, however, did not impede the Kremlin’s turn toward containment—a movement that was apparently underestimated in Washington. For Moscow, the restart was a way to try Obama’s patience with a perpetual response of “Nyet!”
In my view, two mistaken premises have informed American policy on Russia. The first one is a hope that cooperation will weaken Moscow’s authoritarianism. This illusion is not an American invention; it dates back to the times of Willy Brandt. In fact, the German elite is still infatuated with this idea, although Washington has apparently rejected this premise now. The second premise is based on the concept of de-linkage—that is, ignoring Russia’s internal political processes so as not to irritate Putin in exchange for his cooperation. As it happens, this “do not irritate” policy has backfired: The Kremlin interpreted it as evidence of President Obama’s weakness and an invitation to make incessant demands that Washington provide “deliverables” and indulge the Kremlin’s complexes. It is not up to me to say whether this policy is still alive today.
Some may raise the objection that a model for U.S.-Russian relations that rejected trust would have produced the same results regardless of whatever approach Washington pursued. I disagree. Prior to 1993, when the new autocracy took shape in Russia, America had a chance to influence Russia’s internal political processes, at least to some degree. But as the Russian political system gathered strength, the chances to influence Russia’s trajectory waned significantly. Nevertheless, the West was able to curb the Kremlin’s repressive appetites, and consequently its drive for external aggression, through the simple mechanism of the Russian elite’s personal integration into the West, and through turning Russia into a gas appendage of the West. At the very least, Washington could have avoided creating a favorable international environment for Putin had it not opted for the laissez-faire approach toward Russia.
Washington has taken a time-out for now—a decision which I would interpret as an inability to move beyond tactical deals. Proponents of the “reset” might reply that Washington’s approach has produced some positive results, such as the Afghan transit route, New START, Libya, and the sanctions against Iran. But I would ask them, “What have you lost by playing games with the Kremlin?” They have lost Russia and its up-and-coming new political class, which accuses the United States of supporting Putin’s Praetorian regime. And what has been gained? If we’re just talking about tactical deals, how secure are they?
The time-out Obama has taken has prevented us from answering the question of how Washington intends to build its relations with Moscow in the future. I do not see an American commitment to strategy. At least, not the strategy that the so-called American strategists offer: one that seeks to involve Russia in a never-ending stream of boondoggle projects (for example, the U.S.-Russia Presidential Bilateral Commission) that are supposed to “create the atmosphere and shape expectations to persuade Russia to act in ways that advance American goals.”
I think another type of strategy is in order, one which would link pragmatism and the normative dimension. It is my understanding that Washington is not ready for such a strategy for the following three reasons. First, it might trigger another aggressive spell by the Kremlin, and it is not clear how this problem could be dealt with. Second, the West, along with the United States, is going through a crisis of its own; now is not the time for strategic decisions. Third, Russia is not an important geopolitical factor for the United States.
Perhaps a time-out is for the best. After all, no politics is better than harmful politics.
But I have to confess that when I read the recommendations of some of my American colleagues for “fixing” the relationship, I get confused about which states and which relationships they are talking about. One expert suggests, for example, that “successful engagement with Russia demands recognition of Russia’s distinct and legitimate national interests.” Fine, but does this mean that President Obama up to this point has failed to recognize Russia’s legitimate interests? The Kremlin would be glad to hear that. And what interests are we talking about in this case: the Kremlin’s interests, or those of Russian society? They are not the same thing.
Another analyst calls for the development of “a shared vision for the relationship that advances each nation’s individual national interests.” But how would one formulate a “shared vision” if the Kremlin’s interest is in weakening America?
Here is one more recommendation for improving the relationship: “We have to learn to delink our relationship with Russia from our views about the nature of the political order that Putin has built.” But President Obama has already severed this link! Did it help improve the relationship?
Perhaps when the West and the United States slough off their complacency and start charting a new course, they will revisit their policy toward Russia and attempt to find an approach that goes beyond cynical deal-making and false friendship. But this would herald a new era, with new leaders and new experts to advise them.
Where are my recommendations for fixing the relationship, you ask? But before one tries to “fix” something, one must first understand why past corrective efforts have all produced the same disappointing results.
